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Only recently, 20 years after transition to a market system, has Russia regained a similar 
production level it had achieved on the eve of transition in 1991. This may sound 
surprising, given its low productivity under central planning which dropped even lower 
during the last decades, and the rather high level of human capital inherited from the old 
regime, considered by many as the main engine of growth. The explanation may lie in 
Russia’s difficulties and failure to transform the institutional infrastructure of the old 
regime to one that would support a market system and a democratic society, the second 
essential engine of growth. The paper surveys the difficulties of the institutional 
transformation using the ‘new institutional economics’ literature, and based on a 
number of international comparative studies provides evidence of the deep institutional 
weakness of Russia. Given the very high ‘cost of transition’, the question is raised 
whether the socialist growth strategy (as such) paid off.    
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It took almost two decades for Russia to regain the level of its production (GDP) 
achieved in the late 1980s.1 That production level, attained during the last years of the 
old regime, reflects the long-term inefficiencies of the communist economic system, the 
declining rates of growth and productivity during the last two decades of the old regime, 
as well as the productivity losses of the failed attempts of partial reforms under 
Gorbachev during the second half of the 1980s. On the basis of these, one could have 
expected a much faster growth after 1992, to reflect a recovery of productivity levels 
based on the gradual elimination of the old regime’s distortions and the introduction of 
mechanisms and institutions of a market economy. Instead, there was a period of steep 
decline in output and a sequence of crises. Only since 2000 has significant growth 
resumed, a trend that continued until the 2008 world financial crisis, which is 
(currently) expected to drop output sharply. The period of impressive growth since 2000 
has resulted from a series of market reforms, as well as the disorganization of the 
Yeltsin term being replaced by a more orderly regime under Putin. But foremost, 
growth can be attributed to the much higher energy and material prices, riding on the 
wave of the global economic boom; and a number of other short-term factors (OECD 
2009; Aslund 2009).  
A ‘more orderly’ regime under Putin, and then Medvedev and Putin, is a mixed bag of 
better order, some continuation of reforms and improvements in the functioning of the 
government and the economy, most of which ended by 2002. At the same time, it meant 
a recentralization of power and increased regulation, a rise in the level of government 
intervention (mostly as ‘command and control’), and quite a significant   
re-nationalization of ‘strategic’ industries (especially in the sphere of energy and natural 
resources, media and defence), increased protectionism and more limited openness, a 
retreat in democracy and freedoms, and increased tension with the west (OECD 2009; 
EBRD 2008). Based on the above, it is difficult to give tribute for the recent (pre-crisis) 
high rates of growth. It is not impossible that some of what may be considered as the 
retreat of reforms had a positive, if only a temporary, impact on growth.2 It is, however, 
agreed by most that the short-term growth factors are running out of steam and that 
growth rates will go down unless there is a serious resumption of structural and 
institutional reforms (EBRD 2008; OECD 2009; Aslund 2009) or a return of high 
energy and resource prices.  
Yet, even if most of the growth in Russia during the last decade can be attributed to 
positive transition reforms, the achievements must be evaluated as modest, achieving at 
best a recovery to the initial, pre-transition GDP level. Bergson estimates the 
productivity loss of central planning for 1975 at about a third as compared to a market 
economy at a similar level of economic development (Ofer 2005: 250-3). Berliner 
(1993: 388-9) estimates the Soviet efficiency gap higher, at 55 per cent, to which the 
effect of the elements mentioned above need to be added. The recovery of these 
productivity gaps is still pending.  
                                                 
1   Russia’s GDP level in 2007 was estimated at 102 per cent of the 1989 level (EBRD 2008: table A.1), 
and at 108 per cent a year later. However, in 2009 Russia’s GDP was projected to decline by 8.5 per 
cent (EBRD 2009: Table 1.1). See also Popov (2009a). 
2   Some of the great laggers in terms of market reforms and democracy, like Belarus and Turkmenistan, 
experienced relatively high growth rates. 2 
Moreover, the old regime bestowed to its successor a number of assets that should or at 
least could have contributed under favourable policies to higher growth. The most 
important was the significant stock of human capital, a relatively advanced educational 
system, research capacity and innovation potential. It also handed over certain material 
infrastructure assets (like transportation networks, e.g., railroads and aviation), and an 
‘advanced’ industrial sector, made up of large enterprises interconnected by elaborated 
networks of supply and a relatively modern urban infrastructure. Taking advantage of 
these assets has been conditional on establishing the proper institutional setting for a 
market economy, an endeavour that so far has been accomplished only partially.   
Total GDP, as discussed above, represents the production capacity of Russia. It should 
be mentioned that GDP per capita grew a bit faster because of Russia’s slowly declining 
population, but more important, private household consumption grew much faster. This 
is indicative of a significant structural shift of GDP from defence, investment and other 
public services to private household consumption (Popov 2009: 8-12). As a result, 
consumption per capita declined less than output during transition’s early years and 
grew faster than output once growth resumed (EBRD, various years). The material 
welfare of households increased even faster after the disappearance of shortages, 
queues, etc. Variety and quality of goods and services increased, including in particular 
the supply of housing, cars, telephones and computers, imported goods, travel abroad, 
media access—all items in great demand and short supply under the old regime (Guriev 
and Zhuravskaya 2009: table 1; Aslund 2009: ch. 3). Welfare was also enhanced by 
personal freedom expanding in many directions. True, structural changes in the 
production mix entailed short-run costs in terms of growth, but these were later partly 
resolved, and contributed to growth.  
The transition and growth experience of Russia were shared by the other transition 
economies, albeit at a different pace. The group of transition economies in Central 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states (CEB) generally managed higher growth rates 
during the last two decades (relative to their initial GDP levels), and by 2007 had 
reached, as a group, 150 per cent of their last socialist level; Poland with nearly 175 per 
cent, took first place. Another group of transition economies in the Balkans and former 
Yugoslavia is on average very close to Russia (attaining around 110 per cent) but most 
countries are below full recovery. Internal conflicts in some successor states have 
postponed recovery. The growth record among the transition economies of the CIS 
group ranges from just above 50 per cent (Georgia and Moldova) to a high of nearly 200 
per cent in Turkmenistan, the highest among all transition economies (EBRD 2008: 13).   
The differences in the growth record among the transition economies are explained by a 
number of factors. With the exclusion of countries faced with the vicious circle of 
poverty, growth is typically higher for the lower-income countries, reflecting their 
greater technological convergence potential. Growth is higher among countries that are 
resource-rich, as for instance Turkmenistan (boosted by high energy prices), among 
countries with shorter periods of communist rule (thus having a degree of modern 
institutional legacy); among countries that can benefit from geopolitical advantages 
(such as proximity to western Europe); countries that joined or are about to join the EU, 
and countries free of internal and external conflicts. Growth is higher also in countries 
that had inherited (and further developed) human capital and innovation capabilities 
and, last but not least, in countries that implemented better policies, economic reforms 
and institutional building. Many of these factors have benefited the CEB countries, and 
hence contributed to their growth recovery as a group. At the same time, a number of 3 
the reform laggers (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus) have also exhibited quite 
high growth and GDP recovery records (EBRD 2008; chs. 1-3; Sinitsina et. al. 2008). Is 
it a question of these countries merely postponing the transition crisis or will they be 
able to benefit from the ‘advantage of being backward’ and learn from the mistakes of 
their predecessors (see Popov 2009).   
This paper concentrates on the impact that the ‘socialist heritage’ had on the Russian 
transition process and its record of growth. From a list of many potential factors, the 
paper focuses on two: first, the system of institutions inherited from the old regime and 
its transformation and second, the inherited human capital and its innovation potential. 
Both are major factors that affected the transition, and are at the same time considered 
to be the key determinants and leading growth engines of the present era. A short but 
thorough recent survey on the role of institutions in the transition process is given in 
Murrell (2008). The institutional approach to transition, dubbed ‘evolutionary 
institutionalist perspective’, which replaced the earlier ‘gradualism’, is embedded in the 
extensive theoretical framework by Roland (2000).   
The choice of Russia as the case study for this investigation is based, first of all, on its 
leading role as the architect of the communist system. The system was tailored in many 
ways to fit (at least, in the eyes of its creators) the economic character and aspirations of 
a large country, rich in natural resources, on the verge of an industrialization taker-off 
and modernization. Russia is where authoritarianism and coercion and the centrally 
planned and directed economic system reached near perfection and where it lasted the 
longest. Russia also lacked significant experience with modern institutions until the 
1917 Revolution. Efforts by the Soviet Union to become a leading military superpower 
correlated closely with the system and made the Soviet model even more oppressive. 
The demise of the Russian-designed system and regime, as well as the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and its empire, and its decline in global status, inflicted a severe moral 
blow on the people. Even though most people had suffered under the old regime and 
many opposed it—and the leadership—there was resistance to change. At the same 
time, the change was embraced by the majority in other transition economies as an act 
of independence from a hated, oppressive colonial power, despite the difficulties of the 
early transition years. Thus, while other transition economies rushed to join the west, 
Russia developed strong sentiments of resentment and suspicion towards the west, 
affecting its international relations, the level of openness and, of late, its transition 
strategy. Russia is the largest transition country in Europe, still claiming to be a world 
power and inserting great economic and political influence on the other transition 
economies in the CIS. Russia, therefore, is of special interest and a symbol and 
showcase of the transition process (see Roland 2000: 338-9).   
The writings of Douglass North (1990, 1999) on the relationship between institutions 
and development are used as the main conceptual framework of the discussion on 
institutions. He looks at the various aspects and qualities of institutions and the mutual 
relationship between them as the tools and mechanisms to expand markets and reduce 
transaction costs and thus contribute to growth. This paper also looks at the more recent 
theory by North, Wallis and Weingast (2005, 2006, 2009) and North et al. (2007) on the 
major transition from a ‘closed state’ or a ‘natural state’—a category that includes most 
of the developing countries as well as the former communist countries—to an ‘open 
state’, implying the developed markets and democratic countries. The analysis also 
relies on the work of Aghion et al. (2009) for an alternative theory of institutional 
transition and corruption, in which the outcome is quite similar to those of North.  4 
The empirical relationship between the quality of institutions-et-governance and 
economic growth is well covered in the literature (La Porta et al. 1999; EBRD 2008; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In earlier papers (Ofer 2003; Keren and Ofer 2008) we 
extensively used the material presented in Governance Matters (various years) by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) and the accompanying World Bank governance 
indicators database. This paper extends the empirical analysis to a number of other 
similar surveys: the global competitiveness index (GCI) of the World Economic Forum, 
and the Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) survey of the World Bank’s K4D 
programme, which presents information on the level and quality of education, 
innovation and ICT and how they contribute to economic growth, as well as on 
institutional quality (World Bank 2009d). These and the other surveys used here 
evaluate the quality of many individual indicators, which are then aggregated into 
clusters representing the fields under investigation. The contribution of the elements of 
the ‘knowledge economy’ to growth in the present era is discussed extensively in the 
literature and there is a growing emphasis on the key role of higher education in this 
process, even in the developing and transitional economies.3 
The recent extensive study by Sinitsina et al. (2008) contains a systematic analysis of 
the many factors contributing to the above mentioned gap and makes an attempt to 
quantify it. Using methodologies similar to ours, the paper, on the basis of a long list of 
indicators, compares performance within the different groups of the transitional 
economies as well as with the performance of various EU country-groups. Therefore, 
the present paper concentrates mostly on a comparison of the performance of Russia 
with groups of countries at similar or lower (or, at times, higher) levels of economic 
development. The main focus of the analysis here is to compare Russia’s performance 
with that of non-former communist countries and to subsequently study the particular 
character of the communist transition. See Sinitsina et al. (2008) for an extensive 
literature survey on most of the relevant topics discussed here.    
The main proposition of this essay is that the past institutional framework of socialism 
and a number of other structural features of the old regime created serious obstacles to 
the introduction of market institutions, to their effective performance, to proper 
enforcement, and that these brought about weak government capabilities and misguided 
policies. The outcome so far has been only partially successful in taking full advantage 
of the valuable assets inherited from the old regime and utilizing them for economic 
growth. Some other structural features of the old regime made the building of new 
institutions urgent, and the failure to create them produced similar negative outcomes. 
Finally, these obstacles still persist today, after two decades, causing, among others, the 
retreat of the reforms that may continue to slow economic growth in the future.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a conceptual discussion of the 
contradictions between the institutional structure of central planning and the 
requirements of rapid economic growth under authoritarian socialism, and the 
institutional requirements and structure needed to lead to a market economy under 
democracy. Using the theoretical framework developed by North and Aghion and their 
colleagues, the discussion concentrates on the nature and role of institutions in different 
economic and political regimes, on the distinction between formal and informal 
                                                 
3   See, for example, Aghion et al. (2010); Aghion et al. (2007); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004); EBRD 
(2008: Ch. 3); Kuznetsov (2007, 2009); Economist (2005); and Ofer (2008a). 5 
institutions and the tension between them, and on the resulting levels of corruption. 
Section 3 surveys the institutional levels reached by Russia by the end of the second 
decade of transition and their impact on its economic performance. Section 4 discusses 
the ability of modern Russia to develop and productively utilize the ‘knowledge’ assets 
bestowed by the old regime. Section 5 concludes.  
2  Institutions under Soviet socialism, market systems and the transition 
2.1  The basic theory of institutions  
How well economies function is, to a large extent, a reflection of the quality of their 
institutions. Well-designed rules that are properly enforced, supplemented by consistent 
and supporting informal norms of behaviour reduce transaction costs and enhance the 
scope and efficiency of the market. Institutions consist of three main elements: formal 
institutions, the rules of the transactions game and the legal infrastructure, the informal 
institutions, the behavioural norms of the bureaucracy and the public and their ‘culture’, 
and of the system of enforcement. Formal institutions are normally embedded in 
organizations that are designed to implement the goals and missions of the institutions 
(North 1990, 1999). A major decline in transaction costs is triggered by a shift from 
transactions that depend on personal relationships to impersonal transactions based on 
universal rules that are enforced effectively by a third party. This can be the legal 
system and the government, but also members of society, based on mutual trust and 
confidence in the proper behaviour of others. Such trust depends on the accumulation of 
‘social capital’, a series of civic institutions and networks that provide for common 
cultural norms, social solidarity and cohesiveness. The quality of government is 
determined, to a large extent, by its success to create good institutions, while proper 
informal behavioural rules complement the formal structure and further reduce 
transaction costs. Finally, since external conditions change all the time, institutions must 
also be able to evolve flexibly in order to accommodate the needed changes. Institutions 
with a higher level of ‘adaptive efficiency’ are better prepared for such changes. One 
problem here is that informal institutions are, in many cases, dependent on history and 
tradition and therefore respond with a lag to changes in formal institutions. This creates 
tensions, raises transaction costs, and delays the effective functioning of newly 
introduced or adjusted institutions.   
In recent works, North, Wallis and Weingast (2005, 2006, 2009) and North et al. (2007) 
expand the institutional theory by dividing all countries into two types (three, actually, 
but we concentrate on two): the limited or closed access or natural state, which includes 
most of the developing and transitional economies. The second type—open access—
encompasses the developed and democratic market economies. Limited access countries 
or natural states are characterized by autocratic or non-democratic rule, by a coalition 
of elites that control (military) power and collect rents by limiting entry of the rest of the 
society to productive activities, and distributing these among the different elites, thereby 
establishing order and stability. It is dominated by personal relationships that also limit 
the potential for specialization and expanding markets:  
Our perspective implies that natural states will only promote growth if it 
does not threaten the existing political system. Non-elites may have just 
as much incentive to prefer stability to disorder as the elites, since it is 6 
they who will do most of the suffering and dying if social order breaks 
down. Natural states therefore promote trade so as to achieve some gains 
from specialization and exchange, but they do so by limiting entry. 
Natural states are the natural outcome of human specialization, in which 
multiple political, economic, religious, and military actors form a self-
enforcing agreement to provide coordinated coercion. The economic 
rents created by limited entry provide the incentives to make the 
agreement self-enforcing. Eliminate the rents, eliminate the agreement, 
and go back to chaos and anarchy (North, Wallis and Weingast 2005: 
23).   
According to North et al. (2009: 27), the transition from a state of limited access to that 
of open access is a discontinuing process of relatively short duration, typically around 
50 years. It is created by incentives to the elite to expand access in various dimensions 
in order to increase its incomes, expanding markets through impersonal exchanges, 
collecting (higher) taxes instead of (lower) rents, by creating other open access types of 
institutions but with limited access that can later open up and expand entry, responding 
to external challenges, etc. Such moves are intended to increase revenue, but they may 
cause unintended changes in other, complementary spheres that could snowball into a 
systemic change. The risk of accompanied disorganization, and therefore failure, is 
always present (North, Wallis and Weingast 2006: 47-70; 2007: 17; 2009: ch. 5).   
North’s observations on the institutional situation in developing countries and 
transitional economies, all considered as limited access states, are rather bleak. The 
combination of the lack of knowledge, improper policies and formal rules, and the 
conflict between new formal rules and fragile enforcement on one side, and strongly 
rooted traditional informal rules on the other, produce a weak institutional environment 
for proper market development. These result in weak rule of law and account for the 
high level of corruption, dysfunctional behaviour and policies by principals and agents 
of the public sector (North 1999; North et al. 2007). The sad truth is that while both 
developing and transitional economies suffer from a greater incidence of market 
failures, which would warrant better government intervention, their institutions are 
faced with serious government failure, and this questions the merits of such 
intervention. In his book on globalization, Stiglitz (2002) makes a strong case with 
respect to the developing and transitional economies for more government intervention 
in a number of areas, including, among others, trade restrictions as part of industrial 
policy, control over the financial sector and financial flows, more limited, delayed and 
gradual privatization and larger budgets and more attention to public and welfare 
services. The dilemma is unfortunately that there may be an underestimation of the 
ability of these governments to pursue such policies in an effective and non-corrupt 
way.  
This dilemma and the possibility that transition will induce greater disorder are both 
embedded in a model of transition developed by Aghion et al. (2009). High levels of 
social capital and trust (SC&T) reduce transaction costs and save on regulation and law 
enforcement, as well as facilitate more impersonal transactions and thus larger markets 
and more specialization. Low levels of SC&T, including high level of corruption or 
other negative externalities in the private sector, encourage people to support more 
regulation and government intervention, even by a corrupt government. This is 
explained by the fact that the cost of government corruption is deemed lower than the 
cost of the negative externalities inflicted by the business sector. The model produces a 7 
case of dual equilibrium and the dynamics depends on the specific starting point: low 
initial levels of SC&T may deteriorate into high levels of corruption and regulation 
while a higher level of initial SC&T may gravitate to regulation free and honest 
government and markets.  
2.2  Institutions and social capital in Russia before the transition  
The task of institution-building in the economies under transition was especially 
burdensome and difficult for three reasons. First, the formal institutional structure under 
the old regime was the diametrically opposite to the one aimed for through transition. It 
is difficult to imagine any other situation with such extreme contradictions between two 
institutional systems. Second, the transition was a major non-continuing process where 
changes had to take place over a short period of time. This was clearly the case under 
the ‘shock therapy’ approach, but even under ‘gradualism’, the period for change was 
relatively short in comparison to an evolutionary development process that can take 
generations, as in many developing economies. Under a speedy transition, the conflict 
between new formal institutions and informal norms of behaviour widens, causing 
higher transaction costs and lower efficiency (Murrell 2008). Third, the main 
responsibility of implementing reforms falls on the government, which is often 
unprepared, unmotivated and weak. The government itself is confronted with similar 
problems at a time when it is needed the most, and can become a major part of the 
problem rather than the solution.  
It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the contradictions characterizing formal 
institutions within the Soviet version of central planning and within the market system:   
Central planning is based on a top-down command hierarchy with limited entry and 
almost no exit while the market system is based on free enterprise and initiative 
from the bottom up and freely agreed upon contracts; and free entry and exit; 
Self-contradictory ‘soft budget constraint’ is king in one system, while the other 
thrives under the straight jacket of a hard one;  
One excludes private property and the other is based on private property rights;  
One uses quantities as the main allocation tool and as a base for incentives at the 
expense of quality and innovation, while the other depends on market prices and 
thrives on improving quality and providing for innovation;  
One finds it extremely difficult and expensive to provide for any change, including 
technological innovation (see Kornai 2009) which can be very problematic 
during a transition period, while flexibility and change are the name of the game 
for the other;   
One practices functional autarky and external and internal secrecy, while the other 
promotes openness in all directions and free trade;   
Under central planning, the financial sector functions as the government accountant 
and auditor while under a market economy it serves as the main resource 
allocation agent, based on efficiency criteria and risk assessment;   
Within one regime, taxes are collected as a matter of automatic accounting 
transactions, indeed, like rents in North’s ‘natural states’, while under the second, 8 
taxes have to be actively collected from the business sector and the population; 
and so on.  
 
According to North et al., the transition to ‘open access’ state is, under natural states, 
facilitated by the development of organizations with ‘modern’ institutional regimes used 
exclusively by the elites but which can be opened to all after transition. These 
organizations consist of what is considered by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009: 158-
69) to constitute one of three sets of ‘doorstep conditions’ that ease and smooth the 
transition. All that is needed is an expansion of their jurisdiction to society at large. One 
example is that of the modern corporation in the west, which was initially designed as a 
monopoly to provide rents to the elites but once corporation registration became free to 
all, it formed the basic foundation of a market economy. This example highlights the 
difference between England as it was modernizing and the transitional economies—or 
Russia— where under central planning the corporation, indeed the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), is a very different institutional entity. The same is true with regard to 
banks, elections and ‘democracy’, as well as many other ‘modern’ organizations. It is 
especially difficult to transform organizations similarly labelled under the two systems, 
but characterized with exactly different institutional content.  
Enforcement under a democratic and developed market system, while strict, is based on 
social consent, an impartial and independent legal system, and a general culture of 
abiding by and following informal behavioural norms. The bulk of the informal 
institutions operate in this manner in support of, and as complements to, formal 
institutions, and therefore reinforce and improve the institutional infrastructure of the 
economy. Under authoritarian central planning, enforcement is achieved through strict 
discipline, harsh sanctions and intimidation, controlled by the Communist Party. The 
‘legal’ system, devoid of real legality, is arbitrary but always sides with the regime 
(Litwack 1991).  
The command and bureaucratic nature of central planning, and complete government 
control of the economy, its assets and transactions, opened the door for corruption that 
could be restrained only partly with very harsh sanctions, fear and intimidation. The 
limited relaxation of discipline and of sanctions, both intentional and unintentional, after 
the death of Stalin, introduced more opportunities for corruption and other anti-system 
activities. Fixed plans and tight supply channels encouraged unlawful action even in 
efforts to meet official production targets. Corruption subsequently became more 
common in the production sector as well as in public services, such as education and 
health, where school certificates, examinations, university degrees and medical 
treatment, lucrative jobs were all quite freely bought like any other commodity. The 
same applied to law enforcement, legal and court services: officials, judges, managers 
and accountants considered themselves part-owners, or at least legitimate 
‘stakeholders’, of the assets and the rents they provided.   
The gully between formal and informal institutions was further widened by the 
hypocritical behaviour of the leadership. This manifested over time as an increasing 
contrast between the declared goals and values of the regime and its hidden agenda. 
Cynicism increased as larger segments of the population recognized the growing gap 
between the declared benevolent goals of the regime and the narrow self-serving 
behaviour of the elite. The response to such hypocrisy was evasion, a growing sense of 
despair and strong mistrust, which further encouraged unlawful ‘informal’ behaviour. 9 
Likewise, elusion became the response to the non-existent sharing of the national 
product among the people. All these contributed to the development of informal norms 
that were based on personal relationships, and were antagonistic to the regime. As put 
by Ledeneva (cited in Sinitsina et al. 2008: 45):  
Social capital in the USSR took a very much specific form of the so-
called  blat, the reputation-based interpersonal networks of informal 
reciprocal exchange with favours of access to scarce goods and services 
penetrated the whole Soviet society.4  
Informal institutions develop in societies in the context of social and civil society 
organizations. In this respect, the communist regime left the Soviet Union as well as 
other transitional economies a scorched land. It eroded all genuine institutions of civil 
society, decimated any remnants of social capital and positive social networking, and 
destroyed the basis for solidarity and voluntary compliance with the law.   
2.3  And under transition  
After transition and the resulting collapse of central planning and of most of the related 
operating tools and raisons d’être of the old institutions, new institutions had to be 
created. Void of domestic experience or traditions, new institutions had to be built on 
the basis of international experience, and were indeed ‘imported’ from abroad. Even 
with the best advisors, design of the new formal institutions must have been hindered by 
the lack of foreign and domestic expertise, particularly given the difficulties of applying 
foreign designs to local conditions and of coordinating their dynamic and interactive 
development over time.    
Even with the best design, implementation faced more serious problems: the new 
imported rules were terra incognita to the officials implementing them but even more 
so to the public. Implementation was also hampered by the resistance of the existing 
bureaucracy assigned to the task. In some cases, the new institutions were manipulated 
to perform secondary unintended functions that contradicted their reform mission 
(Polishchuk 2009).  
The radical change of formal institutions left informal behaviour patterns lagging 
behind. On the one hand, the legacy of opposing the government and circumventing its 
orders was now directed at the new government and unfamiliar institutions. The lure of, 
and incentives for, illegal action were much stronger, given the huge stock of public 
assets available for redistribution. Paradoxically, the ‘winds of freedom’ (glastnost) 
were translated into and interpreted as an extreme version of laissez faire and the 
exaggerated freedom of action. At the same time, the erosion in discipline from above 
was not compensated by greater interpersonal trust and social cohesion. Tension 
between the newly introduced formal institutions and the old established informal ones 
hampered the transition progress.  
                                                 
4   A study by Denisova et al. (2009: 8-9) based on RLMS reports a high level of ‘trust in most other 
people’ in 1991, just before the fall of the Soviet Union. The authors themselves doubt that this was 
really the case. 10 
The tension between the old and new can best be seen in the context of a number of 
important public organizations that are the key to successful change. The legal system 
needed to introduce and enforce a completely new body of private property rights and 
protection, especially in connection with the privatization of public enterprises and the 
new regime of corporate governance. It also needed to adopt the role of an honest 
enforcer of contracts and arbiter between governmental agencies and the public. The 
police and other law enforcement agencies had to change in the same way. The financial 
and banking sector had to reinvent itself completely from a virtual government agency 
into the main vehicle of financing according to sound economic criteria. This implied a 
revolutionary new role for the central bank. The government had to establish, virtually 
form scratch, a new tax system that included an effective tax collection mechanism and 
becoming an organization able to overcome strong resistance from the newly created 
business sector at paying taxes.  
After privatization, the government had to change its role as top manager and owner of 
the production sector to that of a regulator ‘at arm’s length’, applying measures such as 
material incentives and the imposition of a hard budget constraint. The government, 
together with the central bank, became responsible for macroeconomic stabilization, and 
had to keep a balanced budget. Its budget had to be reduced to new level consistent with 
its new capacity to collect taxes. Budget reduction was achieved by reducing or 
eliminating direct support to and investment in the production sector, cutting defence 
expenditures and by concentrating public funding to social services (education, and 
health), infrastructure and to social safety nets to soften the negative impact of the 
reforms. The newly elected parliaments should have resisted the temptation to use their 
newly acquired powers and should have refrained from populist measures. Kornai has 
coined the term ‘premature welfare state’ to underline the government’s burden in the 
transition process. Others researchers show that larger social budgets seem to be 
correlated with a more successful transition.5 
A weak government with limited implementation and enforcement capacities opens the 
door to corruption and to ‘state-capture’ (Hellman et al. 2000) and the growth of 
substitute private contract enforcement organizations. The large volumes of assets 
waiting to be privatized and of legislation to be enacted in a context of antagonistic 
informal institutions and behaviour by the government bureaucracy and by the 
production managers provided ample opportunities for such behaviour (La Porta et al. 
1999: 17, 28-9). A strong government, which could be a democratic one, can avoid the 
low level and corrupt equilibrium described above, and can aim towards a reform- and 
growth-oriented high level equilibrium. Capacity of the government to act in this 
manner may depend, to some extent, also on the size of its budget, and the initial 
pressures to initiate sharp budgetary cuts are partly eased later (Popov 2000, 2009).   
3  Russia’s transition record: building new institutions  
In this section, information is collected from a number of surveys on the quality of 
governance and the institutional development of various countries in order to evaluate 
the extent of institution-building in Russia during transition thus far. As already 
mentioned, the paper compares Russia’s success in this sphere with that of a group of 
                                                 
5   See among others, Popov (2000, 2009); La Porta et al. (1999); EBRD (2008: ch. 3). 11 
countries at a similar GDP per capita level, i.e., the ‘upper middle-income’ countries 
(UMI) according to the WB classification.6 Comparisons with other groups of 
developing countries are also used, although comparisons with other groups of 
transitional economies are limited, since much of these data have recently been analysed 
in great detail (EBRD; Sinitsina et al. 2008). A consistent finding of this literature is the 
‘great divide’ with respect to the transition performance between the CEB and CIS 
countries, including Russia. 
3.1  The transition indicators from the EBRD 
Despite the foregoing, we believe it appropriate to start with a review of Russia’s 
transition record, as given in the Transition Report, developed and reported annually by 
the EBRD. The index is made up of nine economic indicators related to the transition of 
enterprises, markets, financial sector and infrastructure. Recently, these nine indicators 
have been classified into the three stages of market-building under transition: market 
enabling,  market deepening and market sustaining (EBRD 2008; ch. 1). Transition 
progress is measured by scores ranging from 1 to 4+, the level achieved by a mature 
market economy. The transition score is divided into three ‘upgrades’ per unit and a 
total of ten upgrades per indicator. This scale is clearly somewhat mechanistic but is 
still indicative.  
Table 1 summarizes Russia’s achievements along the three stages.7 Russia has reached 
55 steps of a total of 90 since 1991. Most of the steps were achieved prior to 2000 
(45/90) and only 10 upgrades have taken place since then (as of 2008). As could be 
expected, transition was more prominent in the area of basic (market enabling) reforms, 
which included price liberalization, small-scale privatization, and openness to trade and 
to capital flows. However, in this last indicator Russia lags behind with a score of only 
3+, implying a retreat due to increased trade protectionism and control over capital 
flows during the last few years. Thus, the total score is 25/30 and there has been no net 
advancement since 2000.   
Russia’s achievements to date with regard to reforms for market deepening and 
sustaining—both more difficult to implement—are a modest 17/30 and 13/30, 
respectively. In all three categories of market deepening, Russia lags behind. Haste and 
shortcomings in the initial privatization process of large-scale enterprises helped to 
concentrate ownership into the hands of a few dozen oligarchs. This development 
provided the government with the excuse and opportunity to renationalize key 
enterprises in ‘strategic’ areas (energy and other natural resources, and the media). The 
modern structure of the Russian industry, consisting mostly of large enterprises and 
elaborate input-output networks, called for early privatization and restructuring of the 
financial sector but only partial reforms have taken place so far (more on this later). 
Unlike most of the transitional economies in Eastern and Central Europe, Russia did not 
invite western banks to take over the bulk of its banking sector. Therefore, market 
                                                 
6   There are 42 UMI countries, ten of which are transitional economies in East Europe, the Baltics, 
Kazakhstan and Russia (World Bank 2009a: 351). Back of the envelope calculations showed that the 
impact of transition economies on the averages of the UMIs is not significant. 
7   The analysis here is based on EBRD 2008 and 2009. EBRD (2009) came out after the draft of the 
paper was ready. In EBRD (2009: 4-5), there are no score changes in any of the indicators for Russia 
or for Estonia and Hungary.  12 
deepening in this sphere is also trailing behind, with total advancement of only 17/30 over 
the entire period, four upgrades since 2000, and a final score of three by 2008 (see also 
OECD 2009: ch. 4; Aslund 2009: 51).  
Transition efforts for market sustaining involve reforms in three areas: improving 
enterprise governance and enterprise restructuring in the production sector, setting up an 
effective competition policy and improving, or at times creating from scratch, the 
infrastructure for transportation, electricity and water and telecommunications, including 
ascertaining their proper governance. By 2008 Russia was far behind on corporate 
governance and competition policy (with a score of 2+ for each). There was only limited 
progress in the former, a decline in regulation and competition policy, both internally and 
externally, and only a modest advancement in a number of infrastructure areas.   
All in all, by 2008 Russia had reached the mid point on the road to becoming a modern 
market economy, a task already accomplished in Hungary (albeit having started the 
process already in 1968), and almost achieved even in Estonia (Table 1). Unfortunately in 
a number of areas—privatization and government intervention, regulation and 
competition policy—there have been recent retreats (Aslund 2009; OECD 2009).  
Table 1 
Transition scores for Russia 
     Russia       Hungary  Estonia 
  89-2000  2000-08  2008 2000 2008   2008  2008 
Enabling markets    22/30   3/30   4+   4-  4-  4+   4+  
Deepening markets    13/30   4/30   4-  2+   3   4-  4- 
Sustaining markets    10/30   3/30   4-  2+   2+   4-  4- 
Total   45/90   10/30   4   3-  3   4   4  
Source: EBRD (2008) and EBRD database, available at: www.ebrd.com. 
 
3.2  The World Bank (WDI) and worldwide governance indicators (WGI) 
The worldwide governance indicators (World Bank 2009c), well-known and extensively 
used, consist of six clusters of different aspects of governance at the national level for 
212 countries. The clusters are calculated as the aggregation of an extensive list of 
available studies and surveys relevant to each particular governance cluster. This is the 
most comprehensive, albeit aggregated, assessment of the levels of broad institutional 
categories. The institutional levels are given in two forms: as percentile ranks among all 
the countries and on a scale of absolute score, ranging between -2.5 to +2.5. See Table 2 
and Figure 1 for the list of clusters and levels for Russia for the period 1996-2008.  
The table and the figure depict a gloomy picture in two respects: first, all scores are 
negative, and according to the most recent survey, are below the 25th percentile, the 
bottom quartile among all countries. Second, there is no significant positive trend 
(beyond the statistical confidence limits) except perhaps for one indicator. Indeed, there 
are a few recent setbacks from the higher levels achieved during Putin’s early years. 
The first two clusters, voice and political stability, denote the quality of democracy and 
political institutions, and the main point to note here is the significant retreat of voice 
since the early 2000s, in both the level of democracy and the range of civic freedoms. 
Can this be the flip side of the significant increase in the measure of government 
effectiveness since the early 2000s? At the same time the levels of the rule of law, 
regulatory quality and the control of corruption are currently very similar to their  13 
Table 2 
Governance indicators (WGI) 
Standard error
Governance score 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
Percentile rank
(0-100)  Year  Governance indicator 
0.11  -0.97  21.6  2008  Voice and accountability 
0.15  -0.57  33.7  2003 
0.21  -0.46  33.7  2000 
0.23  -0.43  34.9  1996     
0.2  -0.62  23.9  2008  Political stability 
0.23  -0.80  23.1  2003 
0.23  -0.72  23.1  2000 
0.32  -1.04  15.4  1996     
0.17  -0.32  45.0  2008  Government effectiveness 
0.15  -0.21  50.7  2003 
0.17  -0.58  33.2  2000 
0.23  -0.51  34.6  1996     
0.16  -0.56  31.4  2008  Regulatory quality 
0.16  -0.37  40.5  2003 
0.19  -0.78  19.0  2000 
0.23  -0.39  28.3  1996     
0.12  -0.91  19.6  2008  Rule of law 
0.13  -0.92  19.5  2003 
0.13  -1.06  14.8  2000 
0.18  -0.67  28.6  1996     
0.12  -0.98  15.5  2008  Control of corruption 
0.13  -0.76  28.2  2003 
0.15  -0.99  13.6  2000 
0.21  -0.80  23.3  1996 
Source:  World Bank (2009c). 
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Mastruzzi (2009). 
Note:   The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance 
provided by a large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. 
These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations. 14 
Table 3 
Governance indicators (WDI), Russia and UMIs, 2008 
Standard error
Governance score 




(0-100)  Governance indicator 
0.11  -0.97  62.8  21.6  Voice and accountability 
0.20  -0.62  61.7  23.9  Political stability 
0.17  -0.32  61.2  45.0  Government effectiveness 
0.16  -0.56  60.0  31.4  Regulatory quality 
0.12  -0.91  59.9  19.6  Rule of law 
0.12  -0.98  59.9  15.5  Control of corruption 
Source:  World Bank (2009c). 
respective 1996 levels, with the first two exhibiting some improvement during the early 
2000s but then, in recent years, retreat.  
How does the institutional level of Russia compare with other countries at the same 
level of economic development? Russia is classified by the World Bank as a upper 
middle-income country (UMI).8 A comparison of the UMI country-group for 2008 is 
given in Table 3, which shows that the average UMI levels converge around the 60th 
percentile for all six clusters. This is, by a wide margin, significantly higher than for 
Russia, where the best result is for government effectiveness, but still trails behind the 
UMI level. Russia’s institutional level is also lower than the average of the lower 
middle-income country group (LMIs) and parallels the average of the low-income 
countries (LIs), located between the 20th and the 30th percentile points. Even here only 
two of Russia’s indicators, government effectiveness and regulatory quality, are above 
the LIs levels. According to these measures, Russia is still in the early stages of 
institution-building and has a long way to go to overcome the institutional barriers 
imposed by its inheritance.  
3.3  The global competitiveness index (GCI) 
and the knowledge economy index (KEI)  
As mentioned above, the WGI is composed of data provided by various individual 
surveys that examine the institutional and other attributes of countries around the world. 
Two of these are presented here. The global competitiveness index (GCI) is compiled 
by the World Economic Forum, with special emphasis on the competitive capabilities of 
countries as gauged by many indicators, including institutional quality. The knowledge 
economy index (KEI)—created by the World Bank using the Knowledge Assessment 
Methodology (KAM) of its Knowledge for Development (K4D) programme—evaluates 
the contribution of knowledge and innovation capabilities of a country to its growth 
potential. Institutional indicators are included in both surveys as the major determinants 
of competitiveness and of knowledge, respectively, and their contribution to growth.   
In what follows, we do two things: first, with the GC index supplemented with the K4D, 
we study Russia’s institutional position in a comparative context. Next, we use the K4D 
survey to estimate and compare the levels of its knowledge and innovation indicators. 
Here K4D leads and GCI supports.  
                                                 
8   See footnote 6.  15 
The GCI is composed of 12 pillars indicating competitiveness, among which only one is 
labelled institutions, but institutions are present in the other pillars, i.e., those capturing 
aspects such as the efficiency of various markets (for goods, labour, financing), business 
sophistication, etc. The indicator levels are identified according to their ranking position 
among the 134 countries and according to a grade (or score) ranging between 1 and 7, 
from worst to best. Table 4 presents a detailed account of the institutions pillar and 
Table 5 the GCI overall rank position and scores for all the 12 pillars.   
A quick glimpse at Table 5 demonstrates that the pillars with large institutional content 
assign the lowest ranks for Russia, far below the corresponding ranks of countries at 
Russia’s income level. Russia is ranked 110th (out of 134) on the institutions pillar with 
a score of 3.3 out of 7.0. The pillar of financial markets ranks the country even lower, at 
112th place with a score of 3.6. Also, the pillar of goods market efficiency assesses 
Russia in 99th place and that of business sophistication 91st. All these ranks are 
characteristic of the range of 42 low-income countries (LIs).9  
The first pillar—institutional competitiveness—includes 18 indicators covering most 
spheres of economic and government activities (Table 4). Here Russia is ranked 122nd 
for the definition and protection of property rights, the cornerstone of a market system 
and a free society, and 98th on the same regarding intellectual property. Positioned near 
or below Russia on property rights are a few Central Asian transitional economies as 
well as countries at much lower economic development levels in Africa, South Asia and 
Latin America.   
A number of indicators explore the quality performance of the government: public 
corruption (diversion of public funds), state capture (favouritism in decisions of 
government officials) and trust of politicians. Here Russia’s scores reduce its rankings 
to or below 100. The same is obvious with respect to the (bureaucratic) burden of 
regulation, ranked 118th, the efficiency of budget allocations, ranked 82nd and the 
transparency of policymaking, ranked 119th. With respect to enforcement, the GCI 
evaluates the judicial system as being highly influenced by politicians and business, and 
the legal system’s enforcement of contracts as extremely inefficient. Likewise, the 
police are found to be unreliable to uphold law and order (ranked 105th).   
The conduct of firms, also part of pillar 1 (Table 4) is no better: the level of ethical 
behaviour is ranked 112th, with a score of 3.5, auditing and reporting standards are low, 
ranked 108th with a score of 3.8, and minority stockholders rights are poorly protected, 
ranked 128th and a score of 3.3. In view of this, it is rather surprising that the survey 
finds the efficacy of corporate boards high and ranks Russia 35th with a score of 5.1 out 
of 7 (investors and boards exert strong supervision of management decisions). These are 
also supported by the rather poor showing of the Russian business sector in a WB 
survey of Doing Business (2009b). On the total costs of doing business, a concept 
similar to transaction costs, Russia is ranked 120th out of the total of 181 countries, of 
which 104 are either low-income or lower middle-income countries; 32nd out of 35 
upper middle-income countries and 22nd among the 25 transitional economies. Russia’s 
ranking is especially low with regard to construction permits (180th), payment of taxes 
                                                 
9  Based on the assumption of a close correlation between the income level and the quality of institutions 
among the developing economies. 16 
(134th) and cross-border trading (161st) but is doing better in enforcing contracts (18th) 
and registering property (49th).  
In the following, we survey the institutional showing (CGI) in three major markets: 
financial, goods and labour markets. As we have seen, Russia ranks 112th among 134 
countries in the 8th pillar of financial market sophistication. We already discussed the 
particular importance of an early transition of the financial sector in order to replace the 
government as it existed under central planning and to provide financial services for a 
fast recovery of orderly production, supply and economic growth. We have also seen 
the low transition scores allotted by the EBRD to Russia’s financial services. Thus, 
despite some minor recent improvements (the establishment of deposit insurance, 
expansion of consumer credits, better functioning of the central bank), Russia’s 
financial services in 2008 were at the level of the South Sahara African countries. 
Russia ranks 107th in the soundness of its banks, 110th on the quality of regulations of 
securities and exchanges, 125th on restrictions on capital flows, 86th on the ease of 
getting loans, etc. (see also Aslund 2009; OECD 2009: 97-124).  
Three groups of indicators demonstrate the weak competitiveness of the goods markets 
in Russia: Its high concentration (limited dominance), poor competition, weak anti-
monopoly policy, and a high burden of support to agriculture, ranking 79th, 108th, 95th 
and 104th, respectively. Likewise, obstacles created by the tax system are ranked in the 
90s-range, and barriers to international trade rank Russia above 100, as high as the 
129th position. The levels of customer orientation by businesses and of customer 
sophistication are also low, ranked in the 70s-range. The extent of time that it takes to 
start a business is still somewhat high, but the number of steps required to obtain a 
license is relatively low (44th rank).10 
 
Table 4 
GCI 1st pillar: institutions 
   Rank 
(out of 134 countries)
Score 
 (ranging from 1 to 7)
1.01   Property rights   122   3.3  
1.02  Intellectual property protection   98   2.9  
1.03   Diversion of public funds   102   2.9  
1.04   Public trust of politicians   111   1.9  
1.05   Judicial independence   109   2.9  
1.06   Favouritism in decisions of government officials   88   2.8  
1.07   Wastefulness of government spending   82   3.2  
1.08   Burden of government regulation   118   2.5  
1.09   Efficiency of legal framework   107   2.9  
1.10   Transparency of government policymaking   119   3.2  
1.11   Business costs of terrorism   100   5.1  
1.12   Business costs of crime and violence   80   4.5  
1.13   Organized crime   105   4.3  
1.14   Reliability of police services   105   3.2  
1.15   Ethical behaviour of firms    112   3.5  
1.16   Strength of auditing and reporting standards   108   3.8  
1.17   Efficacy of corporate boards   35   5.1  
1.18   Protection of minority shareholders’ interests   128   3.3  
Source:  GCI database, available at: www.weforum.org. 
                                                 
10  See the RF table in CGI. A detailed discussion on the high level of regulation and intervention by the 
Russian government in the goods market is included in OECD (2009: ch. 5 and Annex 5.A1).  17 
Russia is ranked high (27th position) in the contribution of its labour market to 
competitiveness. This surprising evaluation is due, in the first instance, to considerable 
flexibility in hiring and firing (ranked 23rd), to the low cost of firing (28th), and to high 
correspondence of wages to productivity (11th on a global scale). The main factor that 
pulls down Russia’s ranking is the high level of non-wage social costs, a direct remnant 
from the old regime (at 31 percent of wages, ranked 112th). Also contributing to the 
poor ranking are low cooperation in labour-employer relations (82nd) and relatively 
high rigidity of employment (87th), which apparently contradicts the low ranking for 
hiring and firing above. The competitive features of the labour market in Russia (and 
other CIS countries) reflect mostly the failure to replace the command nature of the old 
regime’s labour market with a more cooperative format of these relations as in many 
market economies (e.g., creation of unions and of collective bargaining), and the pro-
labour legislation that imposes constraints and limits free competition in labour markets 
in developed economies, especially in western Europe. This is not the place to discuss 
what might constitute optimal competitiveness in the labour market: it well may lie 
somewhat to the ‘left’ of the present ‘free’ market situation in Russia. The point to be 
made here is that after 20 years into the transition, the Russian labour market has failed 
so far to reorganize itself to free market conditions. On the other hand, the heritage of 
the old regime also includes the relatively high burden of non-wage social costs (that 
many employers still try to evade) as well as the high participation rate of women in the 
labourforce, a clear advantage, and the relatively low level of braindrain (rank 44th), 
thus testifying to some extent to the relatively good quality of the educational and 
research infrastructure.  
Table 5 
Global competitiveness index, 12 pillars 
 Rank   
(out of 134 countries) 
 
Score (1-7) 
GCI 2008–09  51  4.3 
GCI 2007–08 (out of 134)  58   4.2 
GCI 2006–07 (out of 122)  59   4.1 
Basic requirements  56   4.5 
1st pillar  Institutions   110   3.3 
2nd pillar  Infrastructure  59   3.7 
3rd pillar  Macroeconomic stability  29   5.6 
4th pillar   Health and primary education   59   5.6 
Efficiency enhancers  50   4.3 
5th pillar  Higher education and training  46   4.4 
6th pillar  Goods market efficiency  99   3.9 
7th pillar  Labour market efficiency   27   4.7 
8th pillar  Financial market sophistication  112   3.6 
9th pillar  Technological readiness  67   3.4 
10th pillar  Market size  8   5.7 
Innovation and sophistication factors  73   3.6 
11th pillar  Business sophistication   91  3.7 
12th pillar  Innovation  48   3.4 
Source:   GCI database; available at: www.weforum.org. 
3.4  Formal and informal institutions: corruption and (dis)trust 
Most of the institutional indicators in pillar 1 as well as those included in other pillars 
reflect their formal structure, in terms of new laws and policies and the establishment of 18 
the proper organizations, etc., as well as their informal side, reflecting the quality of 
behaviour of the relevant agents and its consistence with the requirements of the new 
formal institutions. It is clear from the low ranking positions and scores that whatever 
the state of the formal institutions, the required informal behaviour frequently did not 
fully follow. Moreover, in view of the lag in the establishment of new formal 
institutions, it is no wonder that informal behaviour followed a negative and opposing 
stance towards them. The visible conflict between formal and informal institutions is 
apparent, for example, in pillar 1 where the efficacy of corporate boards received high 
marks at a time when minority rights were poorly protected and the ethical behaviour of 
firms was ranked 112th.  
The most explicit manifestation of poor quality and non-cooperative informal 
institutions is the low level of social capital, expressed as the overall lack of trust and 
corrupt behaviour and state capture. Some of this may be the outcome of the unfamiliar 
nature of the new institutions, many of which were imported, and of the new and 
unfamiliar roles played by entrepreneurs, employers and ‘businessmen’ (no longer 
Rukovoditeli), bureaucrats, and fellow citizens. Much of this negative reaction and lack 
of trust were relics of the old regime’s behaviour patterns. We have already seen the 
very poor position of Russia with respect to control of corruption of the WGI indicators, 
as well as the GCI ranking of Russia in positions 102nd, 111th, and 88th regarding the 
diversion of public funds, the public trust of politicians and organized crime, 
respectively (Table 4). According to the GCI survey, corruption is also the most serious 
problem with respect to conducting business in Russia, as indicated by 19.4 per cent of 
the respondents.  
3.5  Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI) 
Transparency International (TI) grades Russia with a score of 2.1 out of 10, placing it as 
147th out of 180 countries, on par with Kenya, Bangladesh and Syria. Transparency 
International’s bribe payers index (BPI) grades Russia the last (first among paying 
bribes in other countries) out of the twenty-two countries included (TI 2009).   
More evidence on the corruption and low levels of trust and of social capital is provided 
by Sinitsina et al. (2008). This plus evidence of the increased support for more 
government regulation and intervention is provided in Aghion et al. (2009) and 
Denisova et al. (2009) The two latter studies also show evidence of an increase in the 
level of corruption since 1989 in the transitional economies, particularly Russia 
(Denisova et al. 2009). It is claimed that this trend represents a shift towards a bad 
‘uncivil’ equilibrium where people demand greater government intervention even while 
recognizing that the government itself is also highly corrupt. People resent the negative 
externalities and bad behaviour of the new business entrepreneurs. The rationale is that 
increased government intervention limiting the negative behaviour of the business 
community, even at the cost of more corruption is the lesser of two evils. Note that 
according to the model, greater government intervention and regulation will intensify 
the level of corruption and erode trust and social capital. All that it takes in order to start 
such a process is a sufficiently high initial level of distrust and corruption, a condition 
easily characterizing Russia. The weak institutional base and considerable corruption 
during the last two decades of the new regime offered minimal opportunity to change 
courses. It takes a very bold move by a (new) government to reverse this trend.   19 
A similar story can be told using the recent conceptual framework developed by North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2005, 2006, 2009) and North et al. (2007). The move by 
Gorbachev to introduce partial reforms intended to expand entrance to the existing state 
of ‘limited access’ got out of control, spilled over to other spheres and brought about a 
much broader systemic change. The many obstacles to the creation of new institutions, 
some of them particularly relevant for Russia, created ‘disorganization’, prolonged the 
process of transition and raised the risks of failure. Measures taken to ascertain that the 
changes were irreversible, like privatization, later backfired, and encouraged the 
government to partly reverse the process. In a way, it was a return to ‘limiting access’ 
on this score, foreign investors included. Weak formal institutions and enforcement and 
a high level of corruption encouraged antagonistic informal institutional behaviour and 
made things worse. North et al. believe it will take 50 years or so to accomplish a 
transition to ‘open access. In Russia, the transition may have to use most of this time.  
4  Human capital, education and innovation 
The Soviet Union was a world power with regard to R&D and innovation, even though 
the majority of this effort was directed to the military at the expense of the civilian 
sector. Innovation effort was supported by an excellent educational system at all levels 
and a network of top research institutes, made up of the largest number of scientists and 
engineers in the world and very generous R&D budgets. Military innovation network 
was promoted through top research centres that were favoured with the best in scientists 
and engineers, materials and other inputs as well as priority status in planning and 
supply. This priority treatment partly compensated for the basic systemic defect and 
many other obstacles to innovation that characterized the centrally planned system.11  
The role of human capital in economic development and growth has been recognized 
for a long time. Under the acknowledged view, developing countries devote most of 
their innovation effort to the importation and absorption of existing technologies for the 
production of goods at the lower end of the product cycle and hence their main 
educational efforts should have been focused on elementary and secondary schools. 
Developed countries, positioned at the technological frontiers, concentrate more on 
pushing this frontier outward and onward to top-level production and new products. 
Thus, they concentrate on higher education and top research centres (Acemoglu, Aghion 
and Zilibotti 2006; Aghion et al. 2009). However, lately, in addition to the above, the 
importance of high-level tertiary ‘centres of excellence’ for learning, research and 
innovation has been recognized also in connection with the developing countries. Their 
active involvement in frontline innovation is considered important for growth as well as 
for limiting the braindrain of the best scientists and for engaging the scientific diasporas 
in ‘brain circulation’. Tertiary education and research, thus, are no less important than 
elementary and secondary schools.12 This is considered relevant for countries such as 
India, China and Brazil, thus Russia should and can definitely aspire to become a front 
runner among the transitional and developing-country economies on the education and 
                                                 
11  See Kornai (2009) for a recent detailed account of the innovation deficiencies under central planning. 
See also Ofer (1987).  
12  World Bank (2002); Chawla, Betcherman and Benerji  (2007: ch. 6); Kuznetsov (2007, 2009); Aghion 
et al. (2007); Economist (2005); Ofer (2008a).  20 
innovation frontiers. In order to achieve this, Russia needs (i) to preserve and strengthen 
its education and research capacities and the organizations inherited from the old 
regime, and (ii) to replace the old institutional and structural settings with those that 
complement market economy and democratic society. These include measures such as 
transforming the incentive structure, the forms of governance and modes of operation to 
open, more flexible systems, improving the curricula contents and the methods of study 
and of doing research, refocusing innovation efforts from military to civilian targets and 
designing better methods of disseminating innovations to the production sector, and 
engaging the private sector as a partner to the innovation effort.  
The GCI ranks Russia’s overall competitiveness level in 2008-09 in 51st place out of 
134 countries, much above the institutional ranks and scores indicated above (see 
Table 5 and GCI). Russia’s higher performance in a number of other areas (see pillars 
below) explains its higher overall rank but also includes, as expected, factors related to 
human capital: education, research and innovation. We return to these factors shortly.  
A similar contrast between the quality of general institutions and of the levels of 
education and innovation in Russia is apparent also in the World Bank assessment of its 
K4D indexes of the knowledge economy index (KEI) and the knowledge index (KI). 
The K4D indexes assess the development (growth) potential of countries on the basis of 
three knowledge pillars: level of education, innovative capacity, and the level of 
information and communication technology (ICT). The three knowledge pillars are 
aggregated into KI (the knowledge index). An additional pillar, economic incentive 
regime (EIR), is combined with the KI to create the overall index, the knowledge 
economy index (KEI), the potential contribution of knowledge of growth, given the 
institutional setting. The EIR includes, among others, many general institutional 
indicators that make up the system tools that enable the knowledge indicators to 
contribute to economic growth.   
Table 6 includes data on Russia’s rankings according to each of the six indexes listed 
above. Here too, as before, Russia’s recent rank with respect to the incentives 
(institutional) pillar EIR is 124th out of 134 countries with a score of 1.55 (lower than 
in 1995), while its KI rank is 41st, indicative of its good performance on the education 
and innovation pillars. The overall KEI index, however, pushes Russia down to 61st 
position, 20 steps lower. Considering the approximate nature of the two assessments 
(GCI and K4D) and the differences in their individual focus, the evaluations are 
consistent with each other.   
The most significant observation in the two surveys is the high ranking and scores for 
the knowledge indicators. In the K4D study, Russia stands 37th on education, 38th on 
innovation but lower, 55th, with regard to its ICT level. These levels and the 
corresponding scores (over a range of 1-10, see Figure 2 and Appendix Table), are 
 
Table 6  
Russia’s ranking, KAM indexes, 1995 and recent  
  KEI  KI  Economic incentive regime Innovation  Education  ICT 
Recent    61   41   124    38   37    55  
1995   56   —   112   55   25   —  
Note:   Innovation indicators weighted by population, 140 countries; recent = 2007 or nearest year.  
Source:   World Bank, KAM database.  21 
Figure 2 
Knowledge scores for Russia and various country-groups, recent and 1995 
Knowledge Economic Index (KEI)  Knowledge Index (KI) 
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Note:  Innovation indicators weighted by population size; recent = 2007, or the nearest year. 
Source:  World Bank, KAM database and Appendix Table. 
above for education and on par for innovation and ICT as compared with the average 
levels of the UMI country-group, and also with the transitional country-group of East 
Europe and Central Asia (EECA). The great divide is much narrower as far as Russia’s 
knowledge indicators are concerned. Unlike Russia’s institutional level, its knowledge 
indexes rank way above the lower-income country-groups (LMIs and LIs). At the same 
time, these knowledge scores are still significantly below those of the high-income 
countries, somewhat less so with respect to education (Figure 2 and Appendix Table). 
At first glance this may be surprising, given the priority granted to research and 
education under the old regime. It may reflect some retreat having taken place during 
the transition years (see below). 
Similar results, albeit somewhat less positive, are observed for Russia in the GCI survey 
(Table 5), in which it is ranked 46th on the higher education and training pillar and 
48th on innovation, both just marginally above its overall rank of 51.13 Russia is ranked 
                                                 
13 Russia’s overall rank of 51st in the GCI is due to other favourable factors: its market size (8th), a 
natural advantage, its labour market efficiency (27th) (discussed above), its success in achieving 22 
just 67th on technological readiness and 91st with respect to business sophistication, 
the institutional underpinning for innovation. Another positive indicator is the quality of 
primary education (31st, see GCI). Based on the GCI, Russia is positioned somewhere 
near the bottom of the UMI group, an adequate position but far from outstanding and 
yet considerably above its institutional ranking.  
The K4D survey goes back to the year 1995 and thus provides a picture of Russia’s 
progress in its knowledge capabilities during transition in a comparative context (Figure 
2 and Appendix Table). The most worrisome observation is the decline in the level of 
the education pillar, down from 25th to 37th position, and score dropping from 8.05 to 
7.09. The initial (1995) significant advantage over the UMI group had almost 
disappeared over the next dozen years.14 In contrast, there was an improvement in the 
rank and score of the innovation pillar (from the 55th to 38th position and from a score 
of 5.6 to 6.9). In this case, the significant initial lag to the UMI has been fully bridged. 
The score of the technological readiness pillar remained unchanged over the period, 
staying around 6, in both cases at the same level as the UMI average, which should also 
be heeded as a warning. Figure 2 and Appendix Table, showing the K4D scores for the 
group of high-income countries, indicate that Russia is quite far behind on innovation 
(but is catching up) as well as on ICT, and trailing slightly on education, where it 
nevertheless is losing ground.  
In recent years, the main detailed indicators that make up score of the education pillar 
(according to K4D, and as compared with the UMI group, Table 7) are literacy levels, 
average years of schooling, enrolment rates, especially in higher education, number of 
teachers and relatively high achievements and quality teaching in the sciences and the 
mathematics.15 Totalling just 3.6 per cent of GDP, the very low public funding at all 
educational levels limits its quality and pulls down the ranking. The education budget 
stayed low, despite sharp cuts in military spending and the avalanche of oil revenues. 
The combination of increased enrolment and low budgets reduced the level of spending 
per student (Sinitsina et al. 2008: 85) which subsequently must have reduced quality. 
This may be also the explanation for the low level of internet access in schools and of 
staff training, and poor quality of governance and management of schools and 
universities (Table 7). The same factors that keep the educational score down are likely 
to be responsible also for its decline during the transition period. Reversing the negative 
trend can be achieved by increasing budgets (some increases have taken place recently) 
but only in conjunction with a radical institutional and structural reform of governance 
in order to better conform to the demands of the new economy, polity and society. What 
is needed is a greater degree of decentralization and independence, academic freedom 
and openness, both within Russia and outside, a broader curriculum, more self-study 
                                                                                                                                               
macroeconomic stability (29th), due to a considerable extent to oil and gas revenues (OECD 2009: 
Ch.1), and in spite of its poor position (109th) with regard to high inflation rate. The level of 
infrastructure, ranked 59th, pushes Russia’s overall ranking somewhat down, mostly due to bad roads 
(104th) and quality of air transport and port facilities (88th and 76th, respectively).   
14  A number of recent studies testify to this declining trend in the quality of the educational system in 
Russia (Sinitsina et al. 2008: 80-7; EBRD 2998: 56-61).  
15    There was a decline during the 2000s in the ranking of Russia with respect to the Pisa tests in 
mathematics, sciences, and reading, but not in the average grades of the Russian students. These were 
however slightly lower than the OECD average of 500 in all subjects (See EBRD (2008: 59), and 
Sinitsina et al. 2008: 86).  23 
and orientation towards problem solving, and combining teaching and research at least 
in the top universities.16  
According to the K4D indexes, the score of the innovation pillar improved during the 
transition after 1995, despite the declining trend in education, and the static position of 
ICT (Figure 2 and Appendix Table). The early transition years triggered a deep crisis in 
the research sector, caused to a large extent by budget cuts, but also by the general  
 
Table 7 
Detailed knowledge indicators: Russia and UMI, 2007 or most recent year 
Income    Russian Federation   
Actual  Score (1-10)    Actual  Score (1-10)  
             Innovation 
4.11  7.03    1.6  2.78  FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2000-05 
967.41  4.83    3.246.21  8  Researchers in R&D/mil. people, 2006 
0.61  5.1    1.07  6.91  Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2006 
49.3  6.88    18  1.31  Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2005 
3.3  6.32    3.2  5.97  University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2007
76.84  6.87    100.68  7.19  Scientific & technical journal articles/mil. people, 2005 
3.28  5.93    3.1  5.48  Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2007 
31.82  7.54    194.4  8.29  Patents granted by USPTO, avg 2002-06 
1.22  7.04    1.34  7.14  Patents granted by USPTO/mil. people, avg 2002-06 
10.03  6.47    8.1  5.97  High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2005 
3.34  6.09    3.4  6.37  Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2007 
4.66  4.88    4.1  2.1  Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2007 
3.68  5.15    2.6  1.3  Value chain presence (1-7), 2007 
             Education 
7.57  6.35    10.03  9.1  Average years of schooling, 2000 
44.01  6.25    72.28  8.84  Gross tertiary enrolment rate, 2006 
3.8  6.15    3.7  5.97  Internet access in schools (1-7), 2007 
4.55  4.64    3.6  2.64  Public spending on education as % of GDP, 2006 
455  3.37    508  7.35  8th grade achievement in mathematics, 2003 
455.71  3.37    514  5.92  8th grade achievement in science, 2003 
4.09  4.95    4.7  7.1  Quality of science and math education (1-7), 2007 
3.9  5.81    3.3  2.82  Extent of staff training (1-7), 2007 
4.26  5.62    3.8  4.19  Quality of management schools (1-7), 2007 
3.41  5.7    3.7  6.29  Braindrain (1-7), 2007 
             ICT 
952.96  6.07    1120.0  6.64  Total telephones per 1,000 people, 2006 
738.89  6.32    840  7.07  Mobile phones per 1,000 people, 2006 
141.92  6.7    120  6.09  Computers per 1,000 people, 2005 
482.44  6.73    99.86  5.44  International internet bandwidth (bits/person), 2005 
238.15  6.45    180  5.5  Internet users per 1,000 people, 2006 
3.93  5.99    4.1  6.61  Extent of business internet use (1-7), 2006 
6.84  4.87    3.2  1.6  ICT expenditure as % of GDP, 2006 
Source:  World Bank, KAM database. 
                                                 
16 For more on the problems and issues of reform in higher education in general and in Russia, see 
Kuznetsov (2007, 2009); Ofer (2008a); Sinitsina et al. (2008: 80-7); Kotkin (2007); Economist (2005); 
Aghion et al. (2007); World Bank (2002); Chawla, Betcherman and Benerji (2007). 24 
disorganization of the systems. Scientists immigrated abroad or gave up their careers to 
look for (any) position in the newly formed business sector. As a result, the number of 
scientists and scientific workers declined by half within a few years (Sinitsina et al. 
2008: 95). Only in recent years has some reorganization taken place, budgets have been 
increased and a programme was put forth to establish centres of excellence (Kotkin 
2007: 6-8).17 According to the GCI survey, the innovation pillar now surpasses the 
overall competitiveness rank of Russia in almost every individual indicator except one: 
innovation capacity, quality of the research institutions, company spending on R&D, 
university-industry research collaboration, utility patents and, of course, the number of 
scientists and engineers (Tables 5; GCI). To these, the K4D survey adds the relatively 
high level of total R&D spending (recently above 1 per cent of GDP), as compared with 
the UMI average. Russia’s innovation capacity is weaker with respect to the production 
of, and trade in, high-tech products, the notorious issue of lack of diversification, 
availability of the latest technology, low inflow of FDI and of technology transfer, firm-
level technology absorption, lower government procurement of high-tech products, and 
a weak ‘value chain presence’ (Figure 2; Tables 7 and A1) These shortcomings, very 
common under the old regime in the civilian sector, now exist also in the sphere of ICT. 
Russia has some advantage over the UMI group in telecommunications, but lags behind 
in most IT indicators: fewer computers, less internet usage, lower ICT expenditures as 
per cent of GDP, and less legislation related to ICT.  
As can be seen above, the overall ranking of Russia with respect to the knowledge 
economy index (KEI) at 61st place is 20 steps below the ‘pure’ KI index, all due to 
internal (inside the sector) and general institutional weaknesses. This is one example of 
how weak institutions and high levels of corruption reduce the potential contribution, in 
this case, of the knowledge assets to the country’s economic development. This pattern 
repeats itself in other spheres where productive assets inherited from the old regime 
cannot be utilized to their full potential because of internal and general institutional 
weaknesses. Other examples are the governance and the industrial structure of public 
utilities and infrastructure, the functioning of the financial sector, the low competitive 
level of the market for goods and services, etc. Sinitsina et al. (2008: 192-7) highlight 
this ‘imbalance in the levels of development’ among the various pillars and call for a 
policy to balance them. The emphasis, in my view, should not be on ‘balanced growth’, 
but on bringing up the institutional level to bridge the gap with the other growth engines 
as soon as possible—in this case, the knowledge assets. A more balanced institutional 
growth in tandem with the economic development is, indeed, a great advantage for the 
many developing economies that are progressing along an evolutionary path and 
gradually establishing new institutions as the need for them arises (Ofer 2004). 
5 Discussion  and  conclusions 
The process of transition in Russia is faced with great difficulties in establishing the 
new solid institutional infrastructure needed for the efficient functioning of a market 
economy and for economic growth. Many of the difficulties originate from the extreme 
                                                 
17  In October 2009 the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation awarded the status 
of a ‘national research university’ to twelve winners of a national competition. The winners will 
receive generous grants from the federal budget over a period of ten years (The Ministry’s website, 7 
October 2009 in Russian).  25 
contradiction between the institutional structure inherited from a regime of central 
planning and authoritarian rule, and the one needed for a market economy and 
democracy. Special attention has to be given to the rigidity, high cost and aversion to 
changes that are embedded in the old system, as well as the growing gap between 
formal and informal institutions. There is also a contrast in the nature of enforcement: 
coercion, intimidation and harsh sanctions under the old regime versus compliance 
based on social capital and trust, supported by ‘democratic’ enforcement methods of the 
new system. The extreme slowness in the creation of a new institutional base , and weak 
enforcement during transition, have kept the ‘transaction costs’ of market operations 
higher and lasting longer, making it more difficult for Russia to take advantage of its 
valuable assets—human capital, innovation and other assets—inherited from the old 
regime.18   
In a recent paper, Popov (2009) comes back to a discussion that took place throughout 
the transition and was already mentioned above, namely, the desired level of the 
government budget during transition. The theory is that given the difficulties of creating 
new institutional infrastructure, governments needed more resources, first of all, for 
effective enforcement but also for preserving the stock of human capital and innovation 
capacity, as well as healthcare and other safety net services. I fully agree. Prudent use of 
Russia’s energy revenues should make this feasible. However, additional resources 
should be strictly and effectively conditioned upon the implementation of the needed 
structural institutional reforms in the economy, the bureaucracy, society and polity at 
large, but also within the sectors that are responsible, for example, for human capital 
and innovation. As Popov concludes—and confirmed, in fact, by many—the allocation 
of energy revenues so far has not been adequate for this purpose and that the abundance 
of natural resources was more of a curse than a blessing in more than one way 
(Polterovich, Popov and Tonis 2008), indeed, facilitating and encouraging the recent 
retreat of reforms. This demonstrates that while more money is essential, the crucial 
issue is guaranteeing its proper use. This is illustrated in the following excerpts from a 
report on the quality of higher education in recent years in Russia:  
Fifteen years into independence, the universal problem in Russia remains 
the need for good management and good governance (of universities). A 
poor governance and incentive structure at universities threatens to skew 
the Russian state’s now-ambitious plans for and major new investments 
in higher education (Kotkin 2007: 6).  
And:  
Amid all the rhetoric about ‘disintegration’, the university system (like 
many other subunits) did not disintegrate. On the contrary, the state 
system proved it could absorb fantastic sums of grant money and more or 
less continue on its merry way (ibid.: 8).  
What is true for higher education is valid for most other entities where old institutions 
need to be replaced by the new (see Murrell 2008).   
                                                 
18 The GCI for 2009-2010 has just been issued as this paper is being published. Over the last year, 
Russia continued to retreat along the competitiveness scale, moving back twelve places on the overall 
GC index from 51st to 63rd position. Almost all the relevant indicators discussed in this paper 
retreated.  26 
One outcome of the difficulties in establishing new institutions in Russia was lower 
rates of growth. Other consequences were the entrepreneurs and bureaucrats capitalizing 
on the disorganization and weak enforcement, and the disappointment of many people 
(and some leaders?) in the virtues of the new system. All this leads towards a low level 
equilibrium (as identified by Aghion et al. 2009) or to renewed efforts by powerful 
groups to revert to limit access (a la North et al.) to collect rents through the (re)creation 
of (new) barriers on ownership, trade, free information, power or, just rent-grabbing 
activity related to the Dutch disease, created by the oil boom. This trend has become 
more visible in recent years when the government became much stronger (even more 
‘efficient’, as we have seen), but diverted its efforts away from the badly needed 
structural reforms (Aslund 2009; OECD 2009). The recent withdrawal from reforms 
need not become permanent. Any of the three conceptual frameworks mentioned above 
(based on Aghion et al.; North et al., or a simple Dutch disease model) may reverse 
itself by forces within the present or future regime. They may all still occur within the 
50-year timeframe suggested by North et al. Even Murrell, who lauds the fast 
institutional advances in the transitional economies of the CEB group, acknowledges the 
slow pace, and even the retreat in institutional reforms in Russia and other CISs (2008).  
Dmitry Medvedev fully recognizes the transition problems existing in Russia today, 
which can and should be addressed by his version of ‘modernization’. According to his 
prognosis of the problem, it is the question of ‘should a primitive economy based on 
raw materials and endemic corruption accompany us into the future?’ To change this 
situation, he proposes replacing the ‘humiliating dependence on raw materials’ with 
knowledge and innovation-based production and growth (dubbed by many as 
‘diversification’) that are founded on both inherited and imported scientific 
infrastructure; honest (non-corrupt) markets and democratic institutions, with less 
paternalistic government intervention and more private entrepreneurship, and active 
civic society (Medvedev 2009a; see also Medvedev 2009b). Medvedev is at present the 
leading westernizer in Russia, while Putin is leaning more towards a Slavophil stance, 
supporting a strategy labelled ‘conservative modernization’ (OSC 2009). Time will tell 
which approach will prevail and to what extent rhetoric can be translated into action. It 
is interesting to note how the quest for knowledge-based ‘intensive growth’ that haunted 
the Soviet Union for decades, is still present, although the ‘culprit’ now is the above 
mentioned ‘humiliating dependence on raw materials’.   
The difficulties and the costs involved in attempts to jump over the cliff separating the 
two contrasting institutional edifices of central planning and the market raise the issue 
of whether the entire communist episode has paid off in terms of a faster pace of 
modernization and growth.19 A comparison by this author (2004, 2008b) on the long-
term economic growth of the Soviet Union and Russia with a counterfactual alternative, 
gives a negative answer. In this paper we have shown in greater detail the impact of the 
difficulties of institutional transition to this outcome.   
                                                 
19  On the cost of switching growth strategies and institutions, see Aghion and Howitt (2009: ch. 11) and 
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006).  27 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 
Scores for Russia, EECA and UMI, recent and 1995 










































































EECA   6.35   6.06   6.65   6.67   5.44   4.22   6.88   6.82   6.74  6.65   6.33    6.55 
HI   8.31   8.61   8.41   8.58   8.03   8.70   9.05   9.22  7.60   7.81   8.58    8.72 
UMI   6.21   6.11   6.35   6.29   5.78   5.57   6.76   6.69  5.89   5.76   6.41    6.40 
LMI   4.10   4.18   4.33   4.49   3.41   3.26   4.95   5.11  3.61   4.02   4.43    4.35 
LI   2.08   2.29   2.15   2.41   1.88   1.95   2.63   2.90  1.71   1.87   2.10    2.46 
Russia   5.40   5.54   6.69   6.57   1.55   2.43   6.89   5.62   7.09   8.05   6.08   6.05 
Note:   Innovation indicators weighted by population; recent = 2007 or nearest.  
Source:   World Bank, KAM database.  
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